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According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, an action is right if and only 
if no other action in the given circumstances would have better consequences. It has 
been argued that this view does not leave us enough freedom to choose between 
actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options. 
In the first half of this article, I will explain why the previous consequentialist 
responses to this objection are less than satisfactory. I will then attempt to show that 
agents have more options on consequentialist grounds than the traditional forms of 
act-consequentialism acknowledged. This is because having a choice between many 
permissible options can itself have value. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Act-consequentialism is a combination of two elements.
1
 The first of these elements 
is axiological. In any given situation, there is a set of actions which an agent could 
do. Call these her options. According to the axiological element of act-
consequentialism, the agent’s options can always be ranked in terms of how much 
value their consequences would have.
2
 Here the consequences of the actions include 
also the doings of the actions themselves. 
 The second element of act-consequentialism is deontic. It states that an 
action is right if and only if it is ranked first in the evaluative ranking of the actions 
which an agent could do in the given situation. If there are many actions which are 
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all ranked first, then the agent is free to do any one of them. This entails that, 
according to act-consequentialism, all other actions are wrong. Act-
consequentialism therefore requires agents to bring about as much value as possible. 
 The aim of this article is to defend consequentialism against a classic 
objection. According to this objection, act-consequentialism fails to provide 
sufficient moral freedom.
3
 In the next section, I will describe this objection. In 
Section 3, I will turn to why the previous consequentialist responses to the freedom 
objection are less than satisfactory. After this, in Section 4, I will begin constructing 
my own positive response to the objection. This section will describe how 
consequentialists can argue that being able to choose an option from a set of many 
morally permissible options can make the consequences of that option better. The 
final, and fifth, section will then use this idea to develop a new consequentialist 
reply to the freedom objection.  
 
2. MORAL OPTIONS AND THE FREEDOM OBJECTION 
Jill has just eaten breakfast. She is undecided about what to do next. She could 
return to bed, watch television, prepare for the next week, visit her elderly parents, 
assist her local homeless shelter and so on. Most of us think that Jill would not do 
anything morally wrong by choosing any one of these options. This would be true 
especially if none of the listed options would have any exceptional consequences. Of 
course, not all actions which Jill could do would be morally permissible. If she 
happened to choose to kill her neighbours, she would certainly act wrongly. 
 According to act-consequentialism, any one of the Jill’s options would be a 
morally permissible one only if none of the other alternatives would have better 
consequences. All the abovementioned options could then be morally permissible 
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alternatives for her only if they all had equally good consequences and there were no 
other options that would have better consequences. 
 It is safe to say that this would not be true in Jill’s situation. It is often 
thought that how good the consequences of an option are depends on how much the 
option brings about pleasure, knowledge, well-being, significant relationships and so 
on. Consider then Jill’s seemingly morally permissible options. It seems unlikely 
that they would bring about exactly the same amount of value.
4
 That various options 
of different types would each maximize the good seems highly unlikely. 
 This means that, according to act-consequentialism, Jill would be required 
to choose one of the options listed above, namely the one that has the best 
consequences. If she chose to do anything else, she would be acting wrongly. Many 
people believe that we should reject act-consequentialism, if it has this awkward 
normative implication.  
 According to this freedom objection, ordinary agents have normally many 
morally permissible options (that is, agent-centred prerogatives). Furthermore, at 
least some of these morally permissible alternatives have worse consequences than 
the other alternatives in the relevant situations. Morally permissible options are thus 
actions that belong to the set of both optimal and sub-optimal actions which we are 
permitted to do. The idea is that a moral theory which does not leave room for a 
sufficient number of such options would be too restrictive and therefore implausible. 
 We can distinguish between the following three distinct objections that can 
be understood as different forms of the freedom objection:
5
 
(O1): A theory is false if it is unable to account for the fact that, in most 
situations, agents have many morally permissible options. 
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(O2):  A theory is false if it is unable to account for the fact that some suboptimal 
actions are morally permissible. 
(O3):  A theory is false if the only way it can account for the fact that, in most 
typical situations, agents have many morally permissible options is by 
appealing to some false (or unsatisfactory) theory of value. 
During the previous informal presentation of the freedom objection, I raised 
objections O1 and O2. The thought was that many traditional forms of maximizing 
act-consequentialism must be false because they fail to account for both the fact that 
in most cases we have a large number of morally permissible options and the fact 
that some of these options are suboptimal.  
 In the following, I will consider the ways in which different forms of 
consequentialism have tried to avoid these two objections. My objections to these 
responses will not always, however, be that they fail as responses to O1 and O2. I 
will also argue some of these responses either (i) fail to avoid O3, or (ii) conflict 
with our particular intuitions about which acts are permissible in particular cases. O3 
could also be raised against my own solution presented in Section 5. However, I 
hope that the theory of value on which it is based (see Section 4) is plausible enough 
to avoid this problem.  
 Before I proceed, I want to set aside an objection to act-consequentialism 
which is related to the freedom objection but which should not be confused with it.
6
 
Let us return to the previous example. It might well be that, if Jill donated all her 
money to Oxfam, this would have better consequences than any of her other options. 
This would mean that act-consequentialism would not allow Jill to choose any other 
option. In fact, she could never do anything else except to use her life to help the 
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people who live in extreme poverty. This seems to require too much from Jill. This 
objection to act-consequentialism is called the demandingness objection. 
 Even if this objection too illustrates how act-consequentialism constrains 
too much what an agent is allowed to do, I believe that Peter Vallentyne is right in 
arguing that the demandingness objection raises a different set of issues than the 
freedom objection.
7
 This is because a moral theory can be demanding even if it 
leaves a lot of freedom to choose between different actions. It could, for instance, 
allow us to use any one of the infinitely many ways of helping others. Even if we 
had this many options, the theory would still require us to give up our own personal 
projects. This shows that a view may allow us to choose between many different 
actions which all are demanding in their own way. 
 Conversely, there could be a moral theory that only required us to stay in 
bed. This theory would not be very demanding but it would still fail to leave room 
for freedom to choose between different alternatives. Because of these two 
possibilities, a satisfactory response to the freedom objection does not necessarily 
help with the demandingness objection and vice versa.  For this reason, I will 
concentrate here only on the freedom objection. 
 
3. THE PREVIOUS RESPONSES TO THE FREEDOM OBJECTION 
Consequentialists have been aware of the freedom objection for a long time and thus 
it has been discussed extensively. The previous act-consequentialist responses to it 
fall into three categories. The responses of first category rely on rejecting our 
common-sense intuitions about what we are permitted to do. The responses of the 
second category try to avoid the objection by reformulating the normative element 
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of act-consequentialism. The responses of the third category concentrate on the 
axiological element of act-consequentialism.  
 
3.1 Resisting Intuitions 
Some act-consequentialists insist that the freedom objection fails because it is based 
on mistaken common-sense intuitions. On this view, it only seems to us that we 
usually have many morally permissible options some of which are also suboptimal. 
However, this is only an illusion. In fact there is always something which we are 
required to do. In this way, these consequentialists reject the desiderata for ethical 
theories on which O1 and O2 are based. 
 The act-consequentialists who give this response recognize that most of the 
seemingly permissible options do not bring about the most valuable outcomes. They 
then argue that it would be “profoundly irrational” to bring about a sub-optimal 
outcome.
8
 This seems to entail that “there can never be reason to produce less of a 
value rather than more” and for this reason it would also be wrong to do so.9 The 
suboptimal actions which we tend to take to be morally permissible are thus argued 
to be actually morally impermissible. 
 There are two ways in which this response can be made more appealing. 
Firstly, it can be argued that our moral intuitions should be disregarded unless they 
can be vindicated by a defensible moral theory. Act-consequentialists can then try to 
show that any moral theory which incorporated moral options could not be given 
coherent justification.
10
 If that were the case, then they would be entitled to claim 
that we should ignore our intuitions about moral options because there cannot be 
good theoretical support for them.  
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 Act-consequentialists can also argue that there is a difference between the 
permissibility of actions and whether we should criticize agents for doing them.
11
 
Some intuitively permissible sub-optimal actions could be claimed to be actually 
morally wrong actions for which the agents are not condemnable.
12
 It could then be 
argued that there is nothing problematic about the fact that we should call most of 
the actions which we could do in any given situation wrong. After all, the wrongness 
of these actions does not imply a negative evaluation of us as agents. Wrongness of 
actions would on this view be cheap and harmless. 
 I have no objections to these responses. If my positive proposal below is 
correct, then it turns out that they are merely redundant. Consequentialists 
themselves would have in that case been wrong about how much moral freedom 
their view provides. If that were the case, there would just be less consequentialist 
motivation for the previous evasive strategies. 
 
3.2 Reformulating the Deontic Element 
The responses to the freedom objection in the second category try to make room for 
morally permissible options which include sub-optimal alternatives by revising the 
deontic element of act-consequentialism. In this way, they tackle both O1 and O2 
directly. 
 Even the move from act-consequentialism to rule-consequentialism could 
be understood as this kind of a response. Rule-consequentialists claim that whether 
an action is right is determined by whether the action would be permitted by the 
optimific set of moral rules.
13
 There are many potential sets of moral principles 
which we could adopt. Whichever set we internalized, this would have different 
consequences. This means that potential sets of principles can be ranked in terms of 
 8  
how good the consequences of their general internalisation would be. According to 
rule-consequentialism, our actions are then right if and only if they are authorized by 
the code which would have the best consequences. 
 This allows rule-consequentialists to argue that the adoption of moral 
codes which leave room for agents to choose between many different permissible 
actions in normal circumstances would have the better consequences than the 
adoption of the more restrictive codes.
14
 In this way, rule-consequentialism will 
make many sub-optimal actions too permissible.  
 For example, rule-consequentialists can claim that having freedom to 
choose between different permissible actions is a necessary precondition for 
autonomous agency. They can also argue that autonomous agency is both 
instrumentally valuable (it brings about more well-being) and intrinsically valuable 
(i.e. good in itself). Thus, a rule that allows agents to choose between many morally 
permissible options will have the best consequences because it will bring about 
valuable autonomous agency. 
 The second response of the ‘normative type’ grants agents an explicit 
permission to pursue some sub-optimal outcomes and thus also increases the number 
of permissible options which individuals have in normal circumstances. This way to 
avoid O1 and O2 is known as the hybrid view.
15
 It accepts the act-consequentialist 
thesis according to which it is always permissible to bring about the best outcome. 
However, on this view, we also in some cases have an additional permission to do 
some actions which will not have optimal consequences.   
 When we assess whether a given suboptimal action is permissible, we 
should take into account two considerations.
16
 Firstly, we should consider how much 
less value this sub-optimal action would bring about. Secondly, we should also take 
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into account how much the agent would need to sacrifice her personal projects, 
relationships and interests, if she chose to do the action with the best consequences. 
An agent is then permitted to do either the optimal action or the given suboptimal 
action, when both (i) the suboptimal action would not have significantly worse 
consequences than the optimal action and (ii) the optimal action would require 
significant personal sacrifices. It can be argued that such permissions to do some 
suboptimal actions must be granted to all agents in order to both protect their 
“integrity” and to recognize the natural independence of the agents’ individual 
points of views from which they pursue their personal projects.
17
  
 Both of the previous responses to the freedom objection contain an 
important insight. Act-consequentialists too should recognize the value of 
autonomy, personal projects and commitments, integrity and individual 
perspectives. I will try to show below how this is possible within a more purely 
consequentialist framework. I will also argue below that, if we truly recognize these 
values within that framework, this will generate plenty of moral options for us. If my 
proposal turns out to be successful, then at least the freedom objection does not give 
us reasons to move to either rule-consequentialism or the hybrid view. 
 There is also a third, less radical way of revising the deontic element of 
act-consequentialism in response to the freedom objection. This is illustrated by the 
so-called satisficing act-consequentialism.
18
 According to this view, right actions 
have ‘good enough’ consequences. One is permitted to do any action such that either 
(i) the value of its consequences does not fall below a certain antecedently specified 
threshold, or (ii) the value of its consequences is reasonably close to the value of the 
best consequences. Satisficers then argue that most of our intuitively permissible 
options (including many suboptimal ones) satisfy these criteria.
19
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 Unfortunately, if satisficing act-consequentialism were true, then certain 
intuitively morally wrong actions would turn out to be morally permissible.
20
 In 
some cases, agents will be able to bring about enough value by either harming others 
or by actively preventing others from getting some benefits. Under the satisficing 
views, some such actions would be permissible because the value of their 
consequences will be close enough to the value of the best outcome which the agent 
could bring about. If we believe that such actions should not be morally permissible 
options for agents, then we cannot accept satisficing act-consequentialism as a 
response to the freedom objection. 
 
3.3 Reformulating the Axiological Element 
The third kind of act-consequentialist responses to the freedom objection focuses on 
the axiological element of act-consequentialism. My own response to the freedom 
objection will also use this strategy. However, in this sub-section, I want to argue 
first that the previous attempts to use this strategy have not been successful. 
   I have assumed so far that the axiological elements of act-
consequentialism are both complete and fine-grained. If this assumption were true, 
then evaluative ties between the outcomes of different options and cases where their 
goodness is incommensurable would be rare. An act-consequentialist could try to 
create morally permissible options by rejecting my assumption.
21
 If we could not 
compare the value of different outcomes or we could do so only very roughly, then 
there would be often many actions such that no other actions would have 
determinately better consequences.
22
 Either the consequences of the other actions 
would be equally good in the rough comparisons or their value would be 
incomparable. Act-consequentialism would then entail that agents would be 
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permitted to do any one of these actions. In this way, this response directly answers 
O1. And, if it were right, then there would be no reason to worry about O2. The 
intuitively permissible suboptimal options could always be argued to have 
evaluative properties that are incomparable.  
 Unfortunately, this strategy fails to save all intuitively morally permissible 
options. A defender of this view has to accept that there are several evaluative 
properties that are incomparable. For each one of these properties, there will be a 
distinct set of more basic natural properties in virtue of which things have that 
evaluative property. The current proposal fails to deal with cases in which the only 
difference between the options which an agent has is how much they have just one 
of those basic, natural good-making properties. 
 It seems plausible that the consequences of actions have one sort of value 
in virtue of how much pleasure they contain. Consider then a case in which Ann’s 
friend Ben visits her. They would both enjoy watching television especially given 
that both The Wire and Breaking Bad are on at the same time. Ann asks Ben which 
show they should watch. It turns out that both Ben and Ann are indifferent between 
the two options. In this situation, intuitively it seems permissible for Ann to choose 
to watch either one of the shows with Ben. However, let us assume that both Ann 
and Ben would ultimately get slightly more pleasure out of watching The Wire. They 
would experience nine units of pleasure if they watched Breaking Bad and twelve 
units if they watched The Wire, and there are no other differences between the 
outcomes of these actions. 
 In order to say that it is permissible for Ann and Ben to watch either one of 
the shows, the act-consequentialist view under consideration must claim that neither 
one of the two possible outcomes would be better than the other. This could not be 
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because the value of the two outcomes is incomparable. After all, only the value of 
pleasure is in question, and it must be comparable how much that single value the 
outcomes have. So, the defender of this response would have to claim that the 
outcomes have an equal amount of the relevant single evaluative property.  
 However, this is not plausible. If pleasure is something which makes 
outcomes of actions good, then the additional three units of pleasure just cannot fail 
to make The Wire outcome better than the Breaking Bad outcome. For this reason, a 
coarse-grained and incomplete axiology is unable to save all the intuitive moral 
options. This means that, even if this response could respond to O1 and O2, it cannot 
generate all intuitively morally permissible options if we assume any plausible 
theory of value. It thus fails to avoid a version of O3.  
 Another version of act-consequentialism tries to accommodate the 
intuitively morally permissible options by relying on many evaluative rankings of 
outcomes.
23
 According to Portmore’s dual-ranking proposal, from an agent’s 
perspective, the actions which she could do in her situation can be ranked both in 
terms of moral and all things considered (moral and non-moral) value of their 
consequences. 
 For example, saving a child from a burning building whilst risking one’s 
life and failing to get to an important meeting can bring about a state of affairs that 
is morally speaking the best from one’s perspective and yet not the best, all things 
considered, from one’s perspective. This is because the potential losses in one’s own 
well-being do not make the resulting states of affairs morally worse from one’s 
perspective and yet these losses do make the same consequences worse all things 
considered from that perspective. 
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 Portmore then claims that an action is permissible if and only if it does not 
have an alternative which is better from one’s perspective in terms of both moral and 
all things considered value.
24
 This explains why it is permissible both to save the 
child in the previous example and not to do so. These actions do not have an 
alternative that would have more of both moral and all things considered value from 
the agent’s perspective.  
 Portmore’s proposal faces a problem when we consider trivial actions that 
are sub-optimal on both accounts.
25
 Some of these actions are permissible options. 
Recall the example in which Ann could either watch The Wire or Breaking Bad with 
Ben. She enjoys both shows even if she too gets a bit more pleasure out of The Wire. 
In this situation, from her perspective, it would be morally better to watch The Wire 
because as a result of that choice Ben would experience more pleasure. The same 
option would also be better all things considered from her perspective given that it 
would give both her and Ben a bit more pleasure.   
 In this situation, Portmore’s dual-ranking view would not permit Ann to 
watch Breaking Bad with Ben instead of The Wire. This is because she would have 
an option that would bring about both more moral and more all things considered 
value. However, it seems that, intuitively, watching either one of these shows should 
be morally permissible. Therefore, Portmore’s view seems to have at least some 
unintuitive consequences.   
 Because of this, Portmore has revised his view. For reasons of space, I 
cannot explain his highly sophisticated view here in full. His basic idea is that a 
given alternative is a permissible option for an agent if and only if the agent does not 
have an alternative which she has both more requiring reason and more reason, all 
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things considered, to perform, where a requiring reason is just a reason that has 
some moral requiring strength.
26
  
 This new view can easily explain why Ann and Ben are permitted to watch 
either Breaking Bad or The Wire. Portmore can plausibly claim that they have no 
morally requiring reasons for watching The Wire but perhaps only so-called 
“enticing reasons”.27 Portmore’s new theory can thus deal with the problem I 
presented for his previous view. The conjunctive condition on the right hand-side of 
his proposal is satisfied by both actions in my case and thus they both are 
permissible options for Ann and Ben. 
 Portmore’s new theory thus has the required resources for capturing the 
extension of morally permissible actions correctly. This is because Portmore helps 
himself to a distinction between morally requiring reasons and the reasons that lack 
such distinct deontic force. However, this solution has a cost. It was an advantage of 
his earlier view that it used purely evaluative rankings of outcomes to determine 
what is required and what is merely permissible. 
 In contrast, Portmore’s new theory takes the basic deontic notion of 
requiring force of reasons as fundamental. It then explains what is required and what 
is not required but merely permissible in terms of this fundamental notion. Thus, on 
his view, what is morally required and what is morally permissible is not a 
consequence of purely evaluative rankings of states of affairs, but rather a 
consequence of which reasons can require and which ones cannot. 
 The alternative I will offer below has at least one advantage over 
Portmore’s view in this respect.28 It does not take deontic notions such as the 
requiring force of reasons as fundamental. In true consequentialist fashion, it takes 
evaluative rankings of states of affairs to be fundamental and then attempts to make 
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sense of deontic notions such as requirements and permissions in terms of these 
more basic rankings. In this sense, my view is more explanatory than Portmore’s 
view. Rather than assuming basic deontic distinctions such as a distinct requiring 




4. THE VALUE OF HAVING MANY PERMISSIBLE OPTIONS 
This section introduces a hypothesis according to which how much value the 
consequences of an option contain can be affected by whether the agent was 
required to choose the option or whether she chose it out of many permissible 
options. I want to suggest that there are ways in which the fact that an agent is 
allowed to choose an option out of many permissible options can make the 
consequences of that option better. Perhaps there are also cases in which giving an 
agent many permissible options can make the consequences of an option worse.
30
 
 Gerald Dworkin has argued that having freedom to choose an option out of 
many permissible options can make the consequences of the option better in three 
different ways.
31
 Such choices can have instrumental value, intrinsic value and 
constitutive value.  
 An option chosen from many permissible options has instrumental value 
whenever the chosen option brings about, as a result of having been chosen from 
many permissible options, other things which are intrinsically good. It might be 
difficult to imagine how a free choice between many permissible options could bring 
about other goods which the chosen option could not bring about itself without that 
choice. However, there is some reason to believe that this is possible.  
 Firstly, it could be claimed that individuals want to be able to choose 
between many permissible options and that they find making such choices 
 16  
pleasant.
32
 In this case, having a choice between many permissible options can be 
instrumental for bringing about desire-satisfaction and pleasure, which are 
intrinsically good.
33
   
 Being able to choose an option from many permissible options can also 
provide us with knowledge about ourselves that we could not learn by any other 
means. As Dworkin points out, if one wants to know whether one is courageous or 
cowardly, one can do so only by seeing which one of the permissible options one 
opts for in certain situations of risk.
34
 If one were always required to choose specific 
options in the relevant kind of risk-scenarios, then there would be no room for the 
type of practical deliberation in those situations that is required for acquiring self-
knowledge about one’s character. One could then argue that this kind of self-
knowledge is intrinsically valuable, and that options can bring about this good only 
when they are permissible but not required options for the agents in the relevant 
situations. 
 It could also be argued that the fact that an option can be chosen from 
many permissible options can have intrinsic value as such. Being free to choose an 
option out of many permissible options would in this case be desirable for its own 
sake. If this were true, then many options would bring about additional value when 
one can choose to do them from many permissible options. This is because one 
consequence of these options in this situation would be that an intrinsically valuable 
choice out of many permissible options takes place.   
 Unfortunately, assessing whether the choices between many permissible 
options really have such intrinsic value is rather difficult (sect. 5.5 below). At best, 
we can support this idea by the observation that we tend to prefer to get new 
permissible options even when we do not end up taking an advantage of them.
35
 In 
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any case, below, I will not rely on the controversial view according to which choices 
between many permissible options have intrinsic value.
36
   
 Perhaps the most important kind of value which the choices between many 
permissible options can have is the so-called constitutive value.
37
 This value does 
not reside in the causal consequences of options or in the choices between many 
permissible options themselves. Rather, the idea of constitutive value of choices is 
that choices between many permissible options can in part constitute larger, more 
complex wholes which have intrinsic value. More specifically, free choices seem to 
have two different kinds of constitutive value.  
 Some free choices between many permissible options have constitutive 
value which is often called “representative value”.38 This type of value can be 
illustrated with an example of a poem. If a poet writes a poem, the value of the 
outcome does not solely depend on the poem’s aesthetic qualities or on how much 
the audience appreciates it. The same poem could have been randomly generated by 
a computer. Yet, the outcome that the given poem exists in that scenario would not 
be equally good. 
 The poem gets additional significance from the fact that the poet chose the 
words out of many permissible options to express her beliefs, desires and emotions. 
The poem, as a result of the prior choices between many permissible options, comes 
to represent the poet’s thoughts. As such a representation, the poem and the choices 
which generated it have constitutive value. After all, the poem and those choices are 
now a part of a larger, more complex whole which includes the poet’s thoughts 
expressed by the poem, the world which these thoughts represent and the audience’s 
appreciation of the poem as a representation of the world. It can then be claimed that 
this complex whole has intrinsic value.   
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 That the poet is able to choose her words out of many different permissible 
options thus makes the world better in its own way. This is one example of the 
constitutive value of choices between many permissible options. This mechanism 
works in the same way when we think about being permitted to choose gifts from 
many permissible options for the people we love. These gifts also get additional 
value from the fact that they express our emotions as a result of the free choice 
which we made between many permissible options. 
 Such choices can also have constitutive value which is sometimes called 
“symbolic value”.39 We intuitively take some outcomes to be better when they result 
from our free choices between many permissible options. This is perhaps easiest to 
see in the case of one’s own actions. I value my career, friends and projects more 
because I have been able to freely choose them out of many permissible options. I 
also value other people’s personal convictions and achievements much more when 
they are consequences of free choices between many permissible options. These 
things deserve far less admiration when they have been chosen for the agents by 
others. Thus, free choices between many permissible options can make the world a 
better place. 
 Why would this be? Compare the situation in which we are free to make 
important life-choices between many permissible options to a situation in which we 
only have one alternative available for us because others have already made the 
choice for us. When our ability to choose between many permissible options is taken 
away from us, this can be understood as a judgement that we cannot make 
reasonable choices ourselves. Such judgements make the resulting outcomes worse 
from our perspective.   
 19  
 In contrast, granting someone a freedom to choose between many 
permissible options is a way of recognising her cognitive capacities to make 
decisions. It can then be argued that such recognition of our rational faculties is an 
intrinsically valuable complex whole, and that having a choice between many 
permissible options is a constitutive part of this whole.
40
 This is another reason why 
choices between many permissible options have constitutive value (called “symbolic 
value”). 
 In the following, I will assume that free choices between many permissible 
options can have value in these ways and perhaps also in some other ways. I will 
also assume that the amount of value which a free choice between many permissible 
options has is a very context-dependant issue. The value of a given choice will, for 
example, on what the other permissible options happen to be.  
 
5. CONSEQUENTIALIST OPTIONS 
I can then finally turn to my own consequentialist solution to the freedom objection. 
This proposal will be based on the thought explained in the previous section; the 
consequences of an option can be better when the agent is able to freely choose the 
option from a set of many morally permissible options. I will first give a more 
theoretical sketch of this proposal. I will then describe a concrete example which 
illustrates it. After this, I will deal with two potential counterexamples to my 
suggestion, explore one more metaphysical objection to it and finally discuss what 
motivation there is for accepting it. I will then conclude by making one further 
axiological observation about the new framework. 
 
5.1 The Proposal 
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My proposal begins from the thesis that, on purely consequentialist grounds, a sub-
optimal option is a morally permissible option for an agent when it is better by 
consequentialist lights that the agent is morally permitted to choose this sub-optimal 
option, whichever permissible option she ends up choosing. More precisely, on 
consequentialist grounds, a suboptimal option A is a morally permissible option for 
an agent whenever A is such that, even if the agent ends up choosing that option 
when it is a morally permissible option in a large set of permissible options, the 
outcome will be better than if she chose some other morally permissible option 
without A being a permissible option for her. After all, in this situation, that the 
agent is able to choose A as one of her morally permissible options increases the 
amount of value there is in the world. 
 This account could be formalized, for instance, in the following way.
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Assume that, in the given circumstances, action-tokens A1, or A2, or …, or Ax are an 
agent’s options.42 Each one of these options would have some definitive 
consequences if the agent chose it when there was a requirement for her to do so. 
Let us assume that A1 would have the best consequences if the agent were required 
to choose this option, A2 would have the second best consequences if the agent were 
required to choose it, … and Ax would have the worst consequences if the agent 
were required to choose it.   
 Let us then use curly brackets for alternative sets of morally permissible 
options which an agent could have.
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 So, if the agent would be free to choose 
between A1 and A2 her set of morally permissible options would be {1, 2}, if the 
agent would be free to choose between A1, A2 and A3 her set of morally permissible 
options would be {1, 2, 3} and so on. My consequentialist proposal for which 
actions are morally permissible options then is:  
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Consequentialist options: An option An is a morally permissible option just 
in case the value of the consequences of An given the set of morally 
permissible options {1, ... , n} is at least as great as the value of the 
consequences of An-1 given the set of morally permissible options {1, …, n-1} 
where An-1 is the least optimal option in {1, …, n-1}. 
 
5.2 An Illustration 
In order to illustrate how this proposal works, we need a concrete example. Let us 
assume that the table below represents Jill’s options in her circumstances. It also 
represents the value of the consequences of those options both when she is required 
to choose them and when she can freely choose them out of certain sets of morally 
permissible options. Here I am assuming that these options are mutually exclusive. 
If Jill does one of these actions, she will not be able to do any of the other 
alternatives. 
  Action Value of consequences when 
required 
Value of consequences of 
Aφ given the option-set 
{1,…,φ}  
A1 Charity-work 200u 200u 
A2 Go to Paris 150u 210u 
A3 Visit parents 100u 215u 
… … … … 
An-1 Stay in bed 20u 240u 
An Ignore Joe’s call -30u 100u 
In this situation, the traditional interpretation of act-consequentialism would require 
Jill to do charity-work. This is because that option has the best consequences (200u) 
when we compare all options as required ones.
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 However, when we ask whether Jill 
has, by consequentialist lights, also a morally permissible option to go Paris, we can 
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apply the consequentialist options principle. According to this proposal, Jill has this 
additional morally permissible option if the value of (a) her going to Paris when she 
can choose between doing so and charity-work is more than the value of (b) the 
charity-work in a situation in which this is required from Jill.   
 According to the table above, the value of the consequences of (a) is 210u. 
It is assumed, at this point, thus that the consequences of going to Paris when chosen 
from the set of morally permissible options of Paris and charity-work are 60u better 
than they would have been otherwise. Adding this value is justified because having 
free choices between many permissible options adds value to the world (sect. 4). 
Thus, the consequences of Jill choosing to go to Paris given the set of morally 
permissible options {charity-work, going to Paris} are better than the consequences 
of her doing charity-work when she would have been required to do so (200u).
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This entails that, according to the consequentialist options principle, it is permissible 
for Jill to go to Paris too in the described situation. 
 At this point, Jill’s permissible options are either to do charity-work or to 
go to Paris. Does Jill also have a third morally permissible option to visit her 
parents? In order to answer this question, we should again consult the 
consequentialist options principle. The table above shows that, if Jill visits her 
parents when it is permissible for her either to do so, go to Paris, or do charity-work, 
the value of the consequences will be 215u. According to the consequentialist 
options principle, we should then compare this amount of value to the value of Jill 
going to Paris when she would have only the slightly smaller set of morally 
permissible options of either going to Paris or doing charity-work.
46
 The value of the 
consequences of that action in those circumstances is 210u.   
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 This means that, if Jill also has the third option to visit her parents, this will 
have better consequences than if Jill chose the least valuable options of the 
permissible options already granted to her. This is why Jill has, on consequentialist 
grounds, also a third morally permissible option to visit her parents. And, by 
iterating this process, we can step by step determine which morally permissible 
options Jill has.   
 According to the table above, Jill would no longer have the morally 
permissible option of ignoring her friend Joe. All the way up to that point, adding a 
new option to Jill’s set of morally permissible options could add value to the world, 
no matter which option she chose from the larger set of morally permissible options. 
But, the basic consequences of this option are already negative in value (-30u), and 
there is not enough additional value in having the freedom to choose this option. If 
Jill were able to freely choose to ignore Joe, the consequences of this action would 
be 100u in total. In comparison if she chose to stay in bed when she has the smaller 
set of morally permissible options in which this is the best option, the consequences 
would be better, namely 240u.   
 In this situation, the consequentialist options principle does not give Jill the 
additional option to ignore Joe. It would therefore only permit her to choose between 
staying in bed and all the other morally permissible options she would have in the 
largest set of morally permissible options arrived at by applying the consequentialist 
options principle that does not contain the option of ignoring Joe. I hope that this 
brief illustration shows how the consequentialist options principle applies in an 
ordinary case. 
 
5.3 Consequentialist Options and the Freedom Objection 
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Of course, the proposal sketched above leaves many details of the view to be 
addressed. In this section, I have room to discuss only some of them. First of all, we 
should recognize that the consequentialist options principle itself is merely a formal 
principle for determining which options are morally permissible on consequentialist 
grounds. The previous example also illustrates how that principle on its own cannot 
tell us which options are morally permissible. The facts about the permissibility of 
different options depend on how much more valuable (if at all) the consequences of 
options are when the agent is able to freely choose them from different sized sets of 
morally permissible options.   
 Section 4 tried to explain certain considerations which can, on many 
occasions, make the consequences of freely chosen options more valuable.  
However, already the previous simple example shows how complex issues we face 
here. I merely selected, for illustrative purposes, the values of the consequences of 
different options so as to get the right intuitively permissible options for Jill. If this 
were an actual choice-situation, in order to fill in the table correctly, we would need 
to know (i) whether Jill wants to make choices between many permissible options 
and enjoys making them, (ii) what kind of representational value her particular 
choices could have (for instance, how much more her free choice to visit her parents 
would mean to them) and (iii) which options Jill must have for her cognitive 
capacities to be recognized. We would need to have all this information to know 
which morally permissible options Jill would have according to the consequentialist 
options principle. 
 However, the point of introducing that principle is more structural than 
practical.
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 According to the freedom objection, we tend to have more morally 
permissible options than act-consequentialism seems to entail. However, if the 
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consequentialist options principle is true, then how many morally permissible 
options we have depends on how much the value of the consequences of our options 
is affected by what options we are permitted to choose from. If choices between 
many morally permissible options can make the consequences of options a lot better, 
then we will have many morally permissible options. In contrast, if no additional 
value is generated by the choices between many permissible options, then 
consequentialism would still not create many options.   
 All of this means that, whatever options we intuitively think we have in any 
given situation, there will be a version of consequentialism that entails that very 
number of morally permissible options.
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 There will be a way of assigning 
additional value for the consequences of options chosen from a given set of morally 
permissible options such that (i) the consequences of the agent having that set of 
morally permissible options are not worse than the agent doing the least valuable 
action from the more limited sets of morally permissible options and (ii) giving the 
agent a more extended set of permissible options could have worse consequences.  
 If this right, then there cannot be an objection to consequentialism per se 
that it does not provide enough permissible options. This means that the freedom 
objection debate will then no longer be about consequentialism as such, but rather 
about whether the kind of axiological views that generate the right amount of 
permissible options together with the consequentialist options principle are 
defensible more generally. If the required view about the value of having many 
permissible options does not turn out to be plausible, then one could argue that at 
least the most plausible versions of consequentialism do not provide all the 
permissible options we think we have. However, at this point, the consequentialist 
could claim that she has been able to make her view compatible to most of our 
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intuitions about moral permissible options. This would mean that she could now 
more easily claim that only some – but not most – of our common-sense intuitions 





At this point, it could be protested that the consequentialist options principle has 
clearly counter-intuitive implications in some hypothetical cases. For the reasons of 
space, I cannot here pre-empt all potential objections, but I want to explain how the 
ideas of the previous section help us deal with at least two problematic cases. 
 Suppose first that Jack really wants to be able to choose between a set of 
permissible options that includes him torturing a baby for the sake of his own mild 
amusement. Suppose also that Jack finds having such an option in his option-set 
intensely pleasurable. It could then be objected that, in this situation, the 
consequentialist options principle entails that torturing the baby for fun is a 
permissible option for Jack.  
 The important thing to observe is that this awkward conclusion does not 
follow from the consequentialist options principle alone. Rather, it is generated by 
an axiological assumption according to which Jack’s act of torturing a baby has 
better consequences when this is a permissible option for him because having this 
option satisfies Jack’s desires and gives him pleasure. There is no reason why a 
defender of the Consequentialist Principle would need to accept this assumption.   
 The defenders of that principle can accept that satisfying a desire to have an 
option and experiencing pleasure from having an option has some modest amount of 
value. This value perhaps makes some alternatives permissible, but not alternatives 
such as boiling babies which have a lot of bad consequences anyway.
50
 It can also be 
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argued that being able to freely choose this particular alternative has little if any 
symbolic or constitutive value.   
 This response suggests a general strategy for dealing with counterexamples. 
Whenever an objection is made that the Consequentialist Principle has counter-
intuitive consequences in individual cases, the defender of this principle will 
consider the axiological assumptions that ground such objections. She will then 
revise the value which was ascribed to being able to freely choose a given 
alternative in the relevant context. The ways in which having free choices can be 
valuable are flexible enough for this strategy.  
  There are cases, however, in which the defenders of the consequentialist 
options principle will dig their heels in. Suppose an evil demon wants me to be able 
to choose between a set of permissible options that includes torturing my baby for 
the sake of my own mild amusement. The demon will wreak untold havoc on 
billions of people’s lives unless it is permissible for me to do this act. In this case, 
the consequentialist options principle would imply that it is permissible for me to act 
in this way. 
 This is a conclusion which the defender of the consequentialist options 
principle should endorse. Consider a case in which an evil demon would wreak 
untold havoc on billions of people’s lives unless I tortured my baby for fun. In this 
case, my intuition is that I should torture my baby for fun.
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 If intuitively I can be 
required to torture my baby for fun in order to avoid untold suffering of billions of 
people, then it should be no less intuitive to accept that in some cases for this reason 
it should be merely permissible for me to torture my baby for fun.  
 Furthermore, the defender of the consequentialist options principle can still 
say many moral things about the permissible option in this case. Even if this act 
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would be permissible, it would still be evil, bad, what I have good reason not to do, 
wicked and so on. Here the point is that we can make many moral and normative 
evaluations of the morally permissible options that an agent has that have nothing to 
do with the permissibility of these options. As a theory of permissibility, the 
consequentialist options principle in itself is neutral about these other moral qualities 
of actions.   
 
5.5 A Metaphysical Objection to the View 
Let us then consider a more metaphysical objection to my proposal. Most ethicists 
agree that, if a certain action-token has a certain moral properties such as 
permissibility, then it has those moral properties necessarily in all identical 
situations. The consequentialist options principle has to agree with this. Once we 
have used it to determine which options are permissible in a given situation, these 
options are necessarily permissible. They are permissible in all otherwise identical 
worlds.  
However, when we apply the consequentialist options principle itself, we 
are required to consider otherwise identical hypothetical circumstances in which 
agents have different sets of morally permissible options available for them. Strictly 
speaking these situations are then impossible states of affairs. I do not believe that 
this is a problem as such for the view. 
This is because it is commonplace to talk about such situations in ethics. 
Philosophers often begin from an ethical principle such as “coercion and deception 
are always wrong” to which their opponent is committed.52 They then consider 
which actions are permissible under this principle and what the consequences of 
those actions’ permissibility would be. In these cases too, ethicists typically describe 
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and discuss impossible states of affairs in which the deontic facts are different than 
what they are necessarily. The application of the consequentialist options principle 
relies on this very same type of hypothetical situations that are strictly speaking 
metaphysically impossible but at the same time at least epistemically possible. In 




 The opponent of my principle could argue that, even if the metaphysically 
impossible situations are metaphysically acceptable, there is no way of determining 
how much value such impossibilities would contain. I admit that it is very difficult 
to evaluate how much value worlds that contain square circles. Despite this, I 
believe that this epistemological worry is exaggerated. 
 Firstly, we are only required to evaluate situations that our otherwise 
exactly like our own actual situations except that different actions are morally 
permissible in them. We are thus not required to evaluate situations that contain 
square circles or people feeling schadenfreude for the good fortunes of others. 
 Secondly, as the example above illustrates, these situations are epistemic 
possibilities because they are conceivable in a strong sense. This is illustrated by the 
fact that we can understand moral views which we do not agree with. We know, for 
example, what it would be like for it to be permissible to kill infidels. In this 
situation, there would be sufficient reasons to kill them and doing so would be 
justified, it would not be appropriate to blame anyone for killing infidels, you should 
not feel guilt for doing so and so on. 
 The final question then is, do we have a method of evaluating how valuable 
the relevant epistemically possible but metaphysically impossible situations would 
be? I described in section 4 the ways in which having many permissible options 
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could be valuable. This could instrumentally, intrinsically and constitutively 
valuable.  
 Evaluating instrumental and constitutive value of different actions will not 
pose any special epistemic challenges. We can consider how much pleasure would 
be experienced in these worlds, how many desires would be satisfied, what agents 
would know about themselves and how valuable such organic wholes as poems, 
gifts, relationships and careers (in which choice plays an essential role) would be in 
the relevant situations. We would do this exactly in the same way as we evaluate the 
value of these considerations in our own world.  
 This leaves us with the intrinsic value of different option sets in the relevant 
epistemically possible but metaphysically impossible situations. This is one of the 
reasons why, in formulating my proposal, I did not want to rely on the intrinsic 
value of having many morally permissible options (sect. 4). For what it is worth, I 
believe that our own carefully considered convictions can offer a reliable guide to 
tricky epistemic questions like this. For one, the fact that we tend to prefer having 
many morally permissible options (we would prefer to live in worlds in which we 
would have more options) can be accepted as evidence of the fact that having many 
morally permissible actions has intrinsic value. Perhaps by considering what we 
would be willing to trade for a larger number of permissible options, we could come 
to understand how intrinsically valuable morally permissible options are. I admit 
that this quick response to the epistemic problems of my view will not probably 
convince everyone.  
 Because of this, it is worthwhile to recall that we can also work in the other 
direction. As section 5.3 explained, we can also begin from our intuitions about what 
is permissible and then use the consequentialist options principle to evaluate how 
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much value we give for having many morally permissible options. In this way, my 
proposal does not even require being able to determine independently how much 
intrinsic value different sets of morally permissible options would have. 
 
5.6 The Arguments for the Consequentialist Options Principle 
So far, I have not provided an argument for the consequentialist options principle. I 
have only argued that, together with certain prima facie plausible axiological 
assumptions, this principle can be used to construct a consequentialist theory which 
fits our intuitions about which options are morally permissible.   
 Of course, this in itself does not give us a decisive reason to accept my 
proposal. Even if my proposal has one advantage, there might be other forms of 
consequentialism that have even bigger advantages. Unfortunately, for the reasons 
of space, I cannot offer here a comprehensive comparison of my view and the other 
forms of consequentialism. I can, however, offer two considerations to motivate my 
suggestion. 
 Firstly, my consequentialist proposal is based on the very same attractive 
general beliefs about morality as many other forms of consequentialism. Like other 
forms of consequentialism, it too takes evaluative notions to be primary and then 
explains deontic notions such as obligations and permissions in terms of the 
evaluative rankings of the states of affairs.
54
  
 It is also based on the attractive idea that links morality to maximizing the 
amount of value in the world. Like act-consequentialists, it too can claim that “[t]he 
dictates of any alternative view will at least sometimes prescribe ‘avoidable’ misery, 
or at least missed opportunities for benefit.”55 According to my proposal, the dictates 
of act-consequentialism prescribe missed opportunities too because, if act-
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consequentialism were true, then agents would have fewer opportunities to make 
free choices between many morally permissible options. As a result, there would be 
less symbolic, constitutive and other forms of value in the world. In this way, my 
proposal can accommodate the attractive general Kantian ideals of freedom and 
autonomy within the consequentialist framework. 
 I can also offer a “Pareto improvement” argument for why my proposal is 
more plausible than many traditional forms of act-consequentialism. Either being 
able to freely choose between many morally permissible options is valuable or it is 
not. If it is not, then the consequentialist options principle collapses into extensional 
equivalence with act-consequentialism. In that case, according to my principle, an 
agent would not have any other morally permissible options than the one option that 
has the best consequences. As a result, the consequentialist options principle would 
have the same benefits and problems as the standard forms of maximizing act-
consequentialism, and so it would be equally good. 
 In contrast, if the consequences of options can be better when agents have a 
larger number of morally permissible options, then it seems like the consequentialist 
options would be more plausible than the standard forms of act-consequentialism. 
There would then be one form of value which the traditional consequentialist views 
could not capture whilst describing which outcomes we should promote. 
Furthermore, in this situation, the consequentialist options principle would also fit 
our moral intuitions about which options are permissible better than the traditional 
forms of act-consequentialism. 
 I admit that these arguments do not amount to a decisive argument for my 
theory. My more modest aim has been to introduce a consequentialist alternative 
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which has at least one important attraction. Arguing for it in more detail must be left 
for another date.  
 
5.7 One Further Observation 
Let me finish by making one further observation. It concerns the axiology which we 
would need to generate a sufficient number of morally permissible options. Consider 
the permissible options ranging from A1 (charity-work) to An-1 (staying in bed) in the 
earlier example. If we ignore the value of being able to choose from many 
permissible options, A1 has the best consequences, A2 has slightly worse 
consequences and so on, all the way to the almost neutral consequences of An-1. Yet, 
every time Jill is granted a new permissible option (an option less valuable in itself), 
there will be more value in the world than there would be without that permissible 
option.   
 This requires that, when we go down the scale of actions and towards the 
larger sets of permissible options, at each step more choice-based value must be 
added to the consequences of options when they are added to the ever growing sets 
of permissible options. The difference in value between doing A2 when that act is 
required and doing it with the set of permissible options {1, 2} was 60u, the 
difference between doing A3 when that act is required and doing it with the set {1, 2, 
3} was 115u and so on. 
 To some extent, such pattern of increases in the value of choice is plausible. 
If you have only two options, you would want to have more of them, your actions 
would not really be representative of your thoughts, your rational capacities would 
not really be recognized and so on. So, being able to choose the second option out of 
the set permissible options containing two options would not add much value to the 
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consequences of that option. However, if you had three permissible options instead, 
maybe you would get a bit more of the choices you wanted, the results of your 
actions would be a bit more representative of your inner world and your abilities 
would be a bit more recognized. Similar increases would presumably take place if 
we added a fourth permissible option, a fifth one and so on.  
 However, at some point, the added value of the new permissible options 
would begin to decrease due to the diminishing marginal utility of having more 
morally permissible options to choose from. The value added to the consequences of 
options by the fact that there are more permissible options to choose from would at 
that point stop compensating for the fact that the other consequences of these 
remaining options are always a bit less valuable. It is difficult to assess whether this 
would happen too quickly for the consequentialist framework to create enough 
permissible options. Despite this, I conclude that the consequentialist options 
principle is well worth investigating further as a form of consequentialism that 
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